When engaging in a philosophical analysis of body and corporeality in a political context, it is essential to ask to what extent, under what circumstances, and in accordance with what moral norms the state performs actions that have the bodies and lives of citizens as their object. This issue was already discussed in ancient philosophy, examples of which can be found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, but also in ancient jurisprudence, especially in the law and the legal doctrine (...) of ancient Rome. Aware of such a previous history of studies on this topic, this analysis will discuss the three main ways in which state power over the life and health of citizens is manifested. Namely: (i) capital punishment (ii) policing and (iii) warfare. In addition, it will be indicated, based on Thomistic philosophy, what moral norms govern these state actions. The fundamental differences between the three main state powers — judicial, police, and military — will also be shown in the context of lethal actions undertaken on their basis. (shrink)

W niniejszej analizie poddane badaniu zostały szczególne działania państwa, które przeciwdziałają szkodzeniu dobru wspólnoty, a mianowicie śmiercionośne działania funkcjonariuszy policyjnych. W tym celu pokazano najpierw, czym odróżniają się one od innych typów państwowego zabijania, a mianowicie zabijania wskutek wyroku sądowego oraz zabijania w ramach konfliktu zbrojnego. Następnie, rozważone zostały dwa główne typy śmiercionośnych działań policyjnych: (1) działania niosące ryzyko pozbawienia kogoś życia oraz (2) działania zmierzające bezpośrednio do śmierci jednostki. Wskazano szczegółowo, kiedy policjanci mają uprawnienie do podjęcia się takich działań. (...) Zagadnienie śmiercionośnych działań policyjnych zostało przeanalizowane z perspektywy tomistycznej. Poza odwoływaniem się do pism Akwinaty, poddane krytycznej analizie zostały stanowiska współczesnych badaczy, czerpiących z tradycji tomistycznej – Johna Finnisa, Edwarda Fesera, Gregory’ego Reichberga, Wendy Hicks oraz Benjamina Wisniewskiego. (shrink)

Obraz jako pojęcie filozoficzne ma długą i złożoną historię, która ma swój początek już w starożytności. Uczeni chrześcijańscy włączyli je do swoich badań filozoficznych w postaci imago Dei. W niniejszej pracy autor dokonał analizy dzieł św. Tomasza z Akwinu w celu ustalenia, jakie konsekwencje antropologiczne wynikają z idei stworzenia człowieka na obraz Boży. W pierwszej kolejności ustalono, że człowiek jako istota stworzona na obraz Boga uczestniczy poprzez swój intelekt w naturze Bożej. Dodatkowo przedstawione zostały trzy etapy uczestnictwa człowieka w Bogu. (...) Następnie autor bronił klasycznej teorii Akwinaty przeciwko współczesnym reinterpretacjom jego myśli. Argumentowano, iż Akwinata słusznie utrzymuje, że jedynie intelektualna część duszy ludzkiej jest, ściśle rzecz biorąc, stworzona na Obraz Boży, natomiast ciało ludzkie (i inne stworzenia irracjonalne) upodabnia się do Boga na podobieństwo śladu. (shrink)

Mariusz Grygianiec has criticized the so called "proofs of nonexistence of general objects" as based on a wrong definition. In this paper one of his arguments is shown to depend on an unsatisfiable condition (contradictory to some basic ontological intuitions) without which, however, it is inconclusive as a reductio ad absurdum. Furthermore, it is suggested that even if the argument was sound, it could by no means be counted - contrary to the Author's intention - as a counterargument to (...) class='Hi'>Stanisław Leśniewski and Tadeusz Kotarbiński. (shrink)

After a brief look at Drafts on Polish philosophy of the twentieth century you could get the impression that this is a work dedicated to the most recent works of Polish philosophy. However after a moment of consideration, it seems hard to believe that a contemporary philosopher would write a history of twentieth century philosophy which could be considered neither as his history nor his philosophy. The distinction between history and philosophy in this case is not accidental since Wojciech (...) Słomski does not try to present a completely closed view of philosophical thought in the last century but aims at expressing that which he himself considers most valuable in contemporary Polish philosophy. It turns out that despite first impressions, we are not dealing with a systematic lecture, maintaining a cold and impartial approach to the subject but with a text written by an independent philosopher who cannot write differently about philosophy than Wojciech Słomski has done. For this reason too, the philosophy in Drafts is a living philosophy, made up of the most current propositions considered by W. Słomski as more important than the task of executing clear distinctions and pigeonholing of presented views into categories created by philosophers. (shrink)

Assuming, according to Jaspers, that the measure of truth of a philosophical system is the lifestyle of its creator as well as his ability at drawing conclusions resulting from philosophical speculation to the requirements of practical action, the question must be asked, to what extent, if at all Wojciech Słomski's book tries to recognise and name the philosophically characteristic merging of theory and practise. Despite this, it shouldn't be the superior aim of any biography, let alone the biography of (...) a philosopher. However in the case of Professor Antoni Kępiński, the connection between theoretical views and real life holds meaning not only for judging the truth of these views but most of all for a correct understanding of them. (shrink)

Summary In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Polish geoscientist, philosopher, and statesman Stanisław Staszic (1755–1826) conducted an extensive geological survey of Poland and adjacent areas. In 1815, he completed a book (in Polish), On the geology of the Carpathians and other mountains and lowlands of Poland, complemented by a well-made geological map of Central and Eastern Europe. Early in the nineteenth century, Staszic refined the idea of ‘geological mapping’, though initially he was interested in the exploration (...) of mineral deposits, rock salt, copper and iron ores, and coal. Unlike his predecessors, his book adopted a temporal subdivision of rocks, using a somewhat modified version of Abraham Gottlob Werner's system. He delineated the surface distribution of five rock units and coloured them onto his map. His work gave expression to his view of geological history, and brought the ‘Enlightenment Period’ of geology in Central and Eastern Europe to a close. (shrink)

During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the domain of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scholars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from (...) both the Anglo-American and European traditions. Not only does it help make some of the best work avail able to an international audience, but it also encourages increased awareness of, and interaction between, the two major traditions. The primary focus is on full-length scholarly monographs, although some edited volumes of original papers are also included. The Library editors are assisted by an Editorial Advisory Board of internationally renowed scholars. Legal philosophy should not be considered a narrowly circumscribed field. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article argues for a unique role of imagination and mental images in the moral education of students. Imagination is rendered here as a capacity oriented toward realizable and salient goals; mental images are understood as particular future-oriented self-representations (FOSRs) devised by and held in imagination. FOSRs have four moral attributes: they are 1) expressive of us as moral agents, 2) shape our moral identity, 3) serve as moral pointers, and 4) help devise mitigating strategies. FOSRs can be created (...) and utilized in educational settings to further the goals of moral education by i) fostering sensitivity to moral situations among students, ii) motivating learners to act morally, iii) facilitating environments supportive of moral practice and moral habituation, and iv) helping strengthen cross-situational consistency of moral action. The four moral attributes of future-oriented self-representations (FOSRs) (1–4) that are to be engaged in moral education to further its goals (i–iv) are correlated with four elements of moral education, namely: a) moral awareness; b) moral competency; c) moral motivation; and d) moral capacity. To argue for the special role of imagination and mental images in moral education this paper integrates philosophical research and conceptual and empirical studies in psychology and education on the morality of imagination and mental images. (shrink)

This article engages the considerations of imagination in Kierkegaard and Ricoeur to argue for a moral dimension of the imagination and its objects. Imaginary objects are taken to be mental representations in images and narratives of people or courses of action that are not real in the sense that they are not actual, or have not yet happened. Three claims are made in the article. First, by drawing on the category of possibility, a conceptual distinction is established between imagination and (...) fantasy, (1) I claim that imagination has a moral dimension because it is engaged in considering real-life possibilities. Second, (2) drawing on Kierkegaard and Ricoeur, it is argued that mental representations of selfhood in imagination have a moral dimension because they essentially allow people to understand the development of agency in human selfhood by means of representations of would-be selves and narrative figurations of the self. Third, (3) mental representations of human selves have a moral dimension because they form important points of reference for moral orientations in the field of human praxis (moral pointers). (shrink)

This article reevaluates the origins of Kierkegaard’s concept of imitation. It challenges the general approach to the genealogy of the phenomenon in question, which privileges the influence of various religious traditions on the thinker and ignores his exposure to the non-Christian literature. I contend that a close reading of the Apology, the Sophist, the Republic, and the Phaedo alongside Kierkegaard’s texts from the so-called second authorship reveals in the dialogues of Plato the three crucial aspects of Kierkegaard’s concept of imitation, (...) namely the phenomenon of following after, the existential, and the non-imitative character of imitation. Lastly, I show that, apart from striving to be a follower/an imitator of Christ, Kierkegaard perceives himself as a follower/an imitator of Socrates. This means that the life of the imitator of Christ is the examined life in the Socratic sense. (shrink)

In [2], Bar-Hillel, Gaifman, and Shamir prove that the simple phrase structure grammars (SPGs) defined by Chomsky are equivalent in a certain sense to Bar-Hillel's bidirectional categorial grammars (BCGs). On the other hand, Cohen [3] proves the equivalence of the latter ones to what the calls free categorial grammars (FCGs). They are closely related to Lambek's syntactic calculus which, in turn, is based on the idea due to Ajdukiewicz [1]. For the reasons which will be discussed in the last section, (...) Cohen's proof seems to be at least incomplete. This paper yields a direct proof of the equivalence ofFCGs andSPGs. (shrink)

We characterize all finitary consequence relations over S4.3, both syntactically, by exhibiting so-called passive rules that extend the given logic, and semantically, by providing suitable strongly adequate classes of algebras. This is achieved by applying an earlier result stating that a modal logic L extending S4 has projective unification if and only if L contains S4.3. In particular, we show that these consequence relations enjoy the strong finite model property, and are finitely based. In this way, we extend the known (...) results by Bull and Fine, from logics, to consequence relations. We also show that the lattice of consequence relations over S4.3 is countable and distributive and it forms a Heyting algebra. (shrink)

The Cognitive Science of Religion represents a contemporary attempt at a naturalistic explanation of religion. There is debate as to whether its account of how religious beliefs arise is reconcilable with the religious account, which holds that religious beliefs are caused by God. In my paper, I argue that these two accounts cannot be reconciled when it comes to the specific question of how Christian religious beliefs arise if one accepts an important theological doctrine of the supernaturality of Christian belief. (...) This doctrine implies that there can be no natural explanation for how Christian beliefs arise because they are a gift of divine grace. This leads to a conundrum for Christian theists: they can either reject the CSR account of how their religious beliefs arise, or they can reject the supernaturality of Christian belief. I argue that the latter is preferable. I then draw on the work of the theologian Denis Edwards to illustrate how one can drop this doctrine without abandoning some other fundamental tenets of Christian theology. (shrink)

Cognitive science of religion is sometimes portrayed as having no bearing on the theological doctrines of particular religious traditions, such as Christianity. In this paper, I argue that the naturalistic account of the etiology of religious beliefs offered by the cognitive science of religion undermines the important Christian doctrine of the grace of faith, which teaches that the special gift of divine grace is a necessary precondition for coming to faith. This has some far-reaching ramifications for Christian theology. -/- .

In authoritarian states, the discourse on freedom of speech, conducted by those opposed to non-democratic governments, focuses on the core aspects of this freedom: on a right to criticize the government, a right to advocate theories arid ideologies contrary to government-imposed orthodoxy, a right to demand institutional reforms, changes in politics, resignation of the incompetent and the corrupt from positions of authority. The claims for freedom of speech focus on those exercises of freedom that are most fundamental and most beneficial (...) to citizens - and which are denied to them by the government. But in a by-and large democratic polity, where these fundamental benefits of freedom of speech are generally enjoyed by the citizens, the public and scholarly discourse on freedom of speech hovers about the peripheries of that freedom; the focus is on its outer boundaries rather than at the central territory of freedom of speech. Those borderline cases, in which people who are otherwise genuinely committed to the core aspects of freedom of speech may sincerely disagree, include pornography, racist hate speech and religious bigoted expressions, defamation of politicians and of private persons, contempt of court, incitement to violence, disclosure of military or commercial secrets, advertising of merchandise such as alcohol or cigarettes or of services and entertainment such as gambling and prostitution. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest krytyczna analiza koncepcji J.H. Newmana, zgodnie z którą doświadczenie sumienia prowadzi jednostkę do wiary w Boga. Fenomenologiczna analiza doświadczenia moralnego prowadzi Newmana do wniosku, że doświadczenie to jest zrozumiałe tylko wtedy, jeśli zinterpretujemy sumienie jako głos Boga. Pokazuję – wbrew Newmanowi – że doświadczenie sumienia nie jest jednoznaczne. Nie da się wyjaśnić, dlaczego jednostka interpretuje je w kategoriach teistycznych, a nie jakichś innych. Potrzebne jest przyjęcie dodatkowych mechanizmów, które tłumaczą, dlaczego jednostka zinterpretowała swoje sumienie w kategoriach teistycznych. (...) Wskazuję, że w dziele Newmana można wyróżnić trzy takie mechanizmy. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to interpret S. Kierkegaard's concept of a leap as a metaphor for the process of moving from one conceptual scheme to another. The basis for this reading of the concept is provided by the growing recognition of Kierkegaard's philosophy as dealing with conceptual schemes, equipements or paradigms through which reality is interpreted. I use Kierkegaard's metaphor as a point of departure for the analysis of the conditions of possibility and the very process of changing (...) conteptual schemes in general. I use the story of Abraham and Isaac, as described in „Fear and Trembling”, as a source of examples illustrating more general points I make during my analysis. Firstly, I present a general understanding of what a conceptual scheme is and how it is functioning. Afterwards, I show how this functioning is impaired in case of Abraham and Isaac. Finally, I put forward a hypothesis that the problems that Abraham's scheme is encountering due to God's demand to sacrifice Isaac can all be reduced to the fact that a very deep change in meaning of certain terms within the conceptual scheme, such as "God", "good" or "duty", has occured. The adoption of new meanings would be equivalent to moving into another conceptual scheme. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically analyse Jerome Gellman’s proposal that there existsa type of experience in which a subject experiences evil and perceives in this evil that there is no God. This a-religious experience gives prima facie support to the belief that there is no God. I show how accepting Gellman’s pro-posal allows us to go beyond the classical distinction between the intellectualand the emotional problem of evil. It also allows us to defend the rationality of some atheists, who do (...) not believe in God because they experienced evil, but do not know the relevants arguments from evil. I suggest that there are twoproblems with Gellman’s account. The first is that there are no clear criteria of identifying a given experience of evil as the perception of God’s non-existence. The second problem concerns the scope of Gellman’s proposal. It is possible that some experiences of evil, which lead people to the belief that there is no God, do not count as perceptions that there is no God. In case of beliefsformed on the basis of such experiences, one must therefore look for another,non-perceptual grounds for justifying such beliefs. (shrink)

In this work, an intuitionistic propositional logic with a Galois connection is introduced. In addition to the intuitionistic logic axioms and inference rule of modus ponens, the logic contains only two rules of inference mimicking the performance of Galois connections. Both Kripke-style and algebraic semantics are presented for IntGC, and IntGC is proved to be complete with respect to both of these semantics. We show that IntGC has the finite model property and is decidable, but Glivenko's Theorem does not hold. (...) Duality between algebraic and Kripke semantics is presented, and a representation theorem for Heyting algebras with Galois connections is proved. In addition, an application to rough L-valued sets is presented. (shrink)

In [4], I proved that the product-free fragment L of Lambek's syntactic calculus (cf. Lambek [2]) is not finitely axiomatizable if the only rule of inference admitted is Lambek's cut-rule. The proof (which is rather complicated and roundabout) was subsequently adapted by Kandulski [1] to the non-associative variant NL of L (cf. Lambek [3]). It turns out, however, that there exists an extremely simple method of non-finite-axiomatizability proofs which works uniformly for different subsystems of L (in particular, for NL). We (...) present it below to the use of those who refer to the results of [1] and [4]. (shrink)

An axiomatics of the product-free syntactic calculus L ofLambek has been presented whose only rule is the cut rule. It was alsoproved that there is no finite axiomatics of that kind. The proofs weresubsequently simplified. Analogous results for the nonassociativevariant NL of L were obtained by Kandulski. InLambek's original version of the calculus, sequent antecedents arerequired to be nonempty. By removing this restriction, we obtain theextensions L 0 and NL 0 ofL and NL, respectively. Later, the finiteaxiomatization problem for L (...) 0 andNL 0 was partially solved, viz., for formulas withoutleft (or, equivalently, right) division and an (infinite) cut-ruleaxiomatics for the whole of L 0 has been given. Thepresent paper yields an analogous axiomatics forNL 0. Like in the author's previous work, the notionof rank of an axiom is introduced which, although inessentialfor the results given below, may be useful for the expectednonfinite-axiomatizability proof. (shrink)

Several Gentzen-style syntactic type calculi with product are considered. They form a hierarchy in such a way that one calculus results from another by imposing a new condition upon the sequent-forming operation. It turns out that, at some steps of this process, two different functors collapse to a single one. For the remaining stages of the hierarchy, analogues of Wajsbergs's theorem on non-mutual-definability are proved.

Artykuł zawiera filologiczno-filozoficzną weryfikację „szkicu przekładu” fragmentów księgi Heraklita z Efezu, jakiego przed rokiem 1921 dokonał Henryk Elzenberg. Własnej próby tłumaczenia maksym Efezyjczyka nie oparł Elzenberg na ich źródłach, lecz na trzeciej edycji zbioru Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1912) Hermanna Dielsa, który wyimki z oryginalnych passusów redagował czterokrotnie i rozmaicie przekładał. By jak najlepiej ocenić i zweryfikować Elzenbergowy „szkic przekładu”, autor przytoczył – kolejno – (1) źródła greckie, (2) własne ich tłumaczenia, (3) teksty greckie analizowanych „fragmentów” Efezyjczyka w redakcji Dielsa, (...) (4) ich niemieckie przekłady autorstwa Dielsa i – na tle ich wszystkich – (5) translatorskie próby Elzenberga. Zastosowana metodologia ułatwiła sformułowanie wniosku, że wierny był wprawdzie młody Elzenberg własnej zasadzie, by niczego – przekładów niemieckiego filologa nie pomijając – nie czytać „potulnie”, na niwie jednak stricte filologicznej bezwiednie padł ofiarą „bezradności” Dielsa, gdyż w jego „szkicu przekładu” aforyzmów Heraklita nic doprawdy nie świadczy o tym, aby (1) odkrył – albo przynajmniej przeczuwał – jakąkolwiek między nimi „współzależność” (Zusammenhang), i by (2) na jej podstawie sformułował jakiekolwiek własne wnioski filozoficzne, odzwierciedlające myśl Efezyjczyka. Najlepiej tego dowiodło porównanie fragmentu B67 z maksymą B53 na tle ich źródeł oraz ich przekładów. *** HERACLITUS IN ELZENBERG’S INTERPRETATION PART I: WHAT MISTAKES COULD THE AUTHOR OF THE TROUBLE WITH EXISTENCE HAVE EASILY AVOIDED, IF ONLY HE HAD VALUED THE SOURCES MORE THAN DIELS’ COLLECTION AND TRUSTED THEM AND HIMSELF MORE? SUMMARY The article contains a philological and philosophical verification of a “sketch of a translation” of the fragments of the book of Heraclitus of Ephesus, which Henryk Elzenberg made before the year 1921. Elzenberg did not base his own attempt to translate maxims of the Ephesian sage on their sources, but on the third edition of the collection Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1912) compiled by Hermann Diels, who had four times edited and variously translated excerpts from the original passages. In order to best evaluate and verify Elzenberg’s “sketch of a translation”, the author has quoted – in succession – (1) the Greek sources, (2) his own translations of them, (3) Diels’ versions of the Greek texts of the Ephesian’s fragments analyzed here, (4) Diels’ German translations of them and – against all of these – (5) Elzenberg’s attempts at translation. The methodology used in the article has facilitated the formulation of a conclusion that although the young Elzenberg was faithful to his own principle of reading nothing whatsoever “meekly” – without overlooking the translations of the German philologist – nevertheless, on strictly philological grounds, he unwittingly fell victim to Diels’ “helplessness”, because in fact nothing in his “sketch of a translation” of Heraclitus’ aphorisms provides evidence that (1) he discovered – or at least presaged – any “connection” (Zusammenhang) between them, or that (2) he formulated on the basis thereof any philosophical conclusions, reflecting the Ephesian’s thought. The best proof of this emerges from a comparison of fragment B67 with maxim B53 based on the sources and the translations. (shrink)

This paper claims that the intuitive and widespread legitimating power of majority rule (MR) arises from the link between majority rule and the principle of equality of political opportunity. The egalitarian character of MR is established by exploring “puzzles” in democratic theory, such as the insensitivity of democratic voting procedures to unequal intensity of citizens' preferences, and the relationship between the principle of unanimity (sometimes thought better to respect citizens' equality) and MR. Special attention is directed to the relationship between (...) political equality and equality in the outcomes of political decisions: The claim is made that the language of equal political opportunity captures well the idea of equal political influence, in the circumstance of disagreement about what is required to achieve equal treatment through the outcomes of political decisions. (shrink)

Article shows, that the practical philosophy of Władysław Tatarkiewicz – especially from his Analysis of Happiness – can be important for the contemporary acting man, which is living always in the own world of the life. In the introduction, author explains the title, assumptions and character of his ethical analysis. Next part shows the subjective perspective of the author’s statement. This is a statement from the work with students of non-philosophical directions. Students’ postulates and questions to ethics, answers of Tatarkiewicz, (...) generalizations and next questions from author – these are the next parts of article. In the conclusion, author writes about his own philosophy, which can be recommended as a little practical philosophy. It is a philosophy for everyday life, philosophy useful in microscale of the moral experience. Across such philosophy, Tatarkiewicz can be an intimate author for more than one his reader. (shrink)

Axiomatics which do not employ rules of inference other than the cut rule are given for commutative product-free Lambek calculus in two variants: with and without the empty string. Unlike the former variant, the latter one turns out not to be finitely axiomatizable in that way.

Aἰών. Eternity in the Theology of Heraclitus of Ephesus -/- This article presents an attempt to establish the Heraclitean meaning of the word αἰών in the fragment B52 (Diels-Kranz). In the author’s view the very starting-point and only sound basis for that kind of endeavor should be meticulous, unbiased analysis of relevant aphorisms of the Ephesian sage and corresponding testimonies. Synoptic scrutiny of them substantiates the understandable conclusion that proud Heraclitus had an unambiguous and independent opinion about eternity. His God (...) – identified with the one and common world – is eternal not only in his „material” aspect as πῦρ ἀείζωον (‘an ever-living fire’, B30), but also in „rational” one as Λόγος ἐὼν ἀεί (‘Logos existing always’, B1). Consequently, one of his various names is Aἰών (‘He Who Always Is’). (shrink)

lt is a commonplace that law and morality intersect and interpenetrate in all the areas of legal decision-making; that in order to make sense of constitutional, statutory or common-law questions, judges and other legal decision-makers must first resolve certain philosophical issues which include moral judgments of right and wrang_ This is particularly evident with regard to constitutional interpretation, especially when constitutions give a mandate for the protection of the substantive norms and values entrenched as constitutional rights. In these Situations, as (...) a leading contemporary legal philosopher observed, the "Constitution fuses legal and moral issues, by making the validity of a law depend on an answer to complex moral 1 problems". But the need for substantive value elucidation is not confined, of course, only to constitutional interpretation under Bills of Rights. This, however, immediately raises a dilemma stemming from the moral diversity and pluralism of modern liberal societies. How can law remain sensitive to this pluralism and yet provide clear answers to the problems which call for a legal resolution? Sharply conflicting values in modern societies clash in the debates over the death penalty, abortion, homosexuality, separation of state and religion, the scope of the freedom of the press, or affirmative action. lt would often be difficult to discern a broader consensus within which these clashes of values operate, unless this consensus were described in such vague terms as to render it practically meaningless. (shrink)

The paper provides an analysis of the relationship between the concepts of justice and solidarity. The point of departure of the analysis is Ruud ter Meulen’s claim that these concepts are different but mutually complementary, i.e. are two sides of the same coin. In the paper two alternative accounts of the relationship are proposed. According to the first one, solidarity can be defined in terms of justice, i.e. is a special variety of liberal justice, viz. social liberal justice, which, apart (...) from the value of liberty, also stresses the importance of the value of equality. An example of such a theory is Rawls’s theory of justice, within which the value of equality is ‘encoded’ in the principle of fair equality of opportunity and in the difference principle. According to the second account, solidarity is an expression of a special type of social relationships – the so-called ‘thick relationships’, which are non-superficial, positive, their paradigmatic examples being family and friendship; in other words, the rules of solidarity are rules that are built into ‘thick relationships’. On the first account, justice and solidarity are not different, while on the second account they are different but mutually exclusive rather than mutually complementary. In the last part of the paper some remarks on the social causes of solidarity are made. (shrink)

This book examines the relationship between the idea of legitimacy of law in a democratic system and equality, conceived in a tripartite sense: political, legal, and social. Exploring the constituent elements of the legal philosophy underlying concepts of legitimacy, this book seeks to demonstrate how a conception of democratic legitimacy is necessary for understanding and reconciling equality and political legitimacy by tracing and examining the conceptions of equality in political, legal, and social dimensions. -/- In the sphere of political equality (...) this book argues that the best construction of equality in a democratic system - which resonates with the legitimizing function of majority rule - is that of equality of political opportunity. It is largely procedural, but those procedures represent important substantive values built into a majoritarian system. In the sphere of legal equality it argues that a plausible conception of non-discrimination can be constructed through a "reflective equilibrium" process, and should reject a thoughtless assumption that the presence of some particular criteria of differentiations necessarily taints a legal classification as discriminatory. Finally, the chapters on social equality explore, in some detail, the currently influential, and presumptively attractive, "luck egalitarianism": the idea that social equality calls for neutralizing the disparate effects of bad brute luck upon a person's position in society. (shrink)